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A Comment on the Deregulation of Industry
DONALD I. BAKER*

The distinguished English jurist Lord Denning, the Master of the
Rolls, once said that "the function of lawyers is to find a solution to
every difficulty presented to them, where the function of professors is
to find a difficulty with every solution." The politician's function, however, is different from that of both the lawyer and the professor, although the politician provides a great deal of work to both. The politician's function is to make every problem-actual or imagined-simply
go away. If the solution is cheap and painless, then it's absolutely splendid. Even if the solution is costly, but the cost is inevitable, then that is
a quite acceptable second-best.
Morever, the political world is highly episodic: it can be moved by
immediate distress to try almost anything (which it did with much of
the 1930s' regulation), or it can be moved by great public indignation
to eliminate something which was highly favored in the recent past
(which it did with the seat belt locking system). Also, the political
world is particularly unmoved by theory. As a former head of the Justice Department's Anti-Trust Division noted recently, "One can imagine
that the countervailing influence of the members of the American Economic Association and others committed to the goal of allocative efficiency would not much impress Congressmen counting noses." 1
I stress this reality because it is there. If we academic lawyers
ignore it, we may amuse ourselves-but we will not much matter. In fact,
we should matter -probably more than the members of the American
Economic Association who have produced all those papers showing the
various costs of regulation. We should matter, because the hard issues
are not so much economic as legal and practical and political. Regulation
is maintained today not by economic theory so much as by a mixture of
mind-boggling complexity which deters general inquiry, by special interests who are well used to protecting themselves, by a populist prefer*Professor of Law, Cornell University. Formerly Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Anti-Trust Division, U.S. Department of Justice.
1Zimmerman, The Legal Framework of Competitive Policies toward Regulated Indusmrs 374 (A. Phillips ed. 1975).
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ence for "competitive equality" as opposed to hard-nosed "competition," '
and by general fear that any alternative may be worse. Thus, while to
my old friend Jim Liebeler and many economists deregulation may
sound like nirvana, to most politicians and members of the public it
sounds more like chaos.
The real question today is not whether we are going to have too
much deregulation, but whether we are going to have any meaningful
deregulation at all. In this debate, it is important to make clear what
the real costs of regulation are, and here we are faced with particular
regulatory schemes and with economic work on their operation and
costs in particular areas. It is also very important to make clear what
practical alternatives exist. Stated another way, what can be done to
assure the public in advance that all hell will not break loose? This, I
submit, requires not a general theory of regulation or of deregulation,
but instead requires a hard pragmatic look at specific schemes that may
well have outlived their usefulness.
This hard pragmatic look involves several questions. First of all,
what exactly are we regulating and why do we think we are doing it
in any particular area? Second, what public goals are at stake? Are
they real? And I think one has to focus on public goals in a very specific way. It is not enough to say, "The goal of regulation here is to
protect the public or to perpetuate the medieval notion of a just price."
We must be much more specific than that. There are of course some
public goals which run across several industries.4 One is to protect the
public in the real natural monopoly situation from monopoly pricing and
arbitrary conduct. A second situation concerns what I will call "common carrier reliability." If you want to be sure that when you pick up
the phone you get a dial tone, or when you walk out to the bus stop
you find a bus before long, then special duties may have to be imposed.
Another public goal may be to avoid unethical dealings or widespread
disruption of the financial system. Another set of broad goals may be
concerned with health, safety, and the environment. Most of these goals
are real; and anyone who proposes a scheme of deregulation that does not
meaningfully address relevant public goals will not get anywhere.
2

Ralph Nader's support for very stringent branch banking restrictions as a safeguard
against "concentration" is a case in point See, e.g., Smith, Nader Clash on Wider Branching, Greater Power to Extend EFT Areas, A.EERicAN BANKER, December 9, 1975, at 1. See
also First National Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1967).
8
See Liebeler, The Deregulation of Industry: How Far Should We Go?, 51 Im. L.J.
735 (1976), supra.
4
See, e.g., Baker, Competition and Regulation: Charles River Bridge Re-Crossed, 60
CoRNELL L. REv. 159, 172-75 (1975).
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Third, what are the most efficient ways of meeting appropriate
public goals? Do such goals really require constant day-to-day involvement of bureaucrats in the basic entrepreneurial decisions in an industry? Can the market be used to encourage efficiency, while still using
other legal devices to assure safety, honesty, service reliability, or whatever? Obviously, complete deregulation is clear and simple where the
regulatory scheme rests on nothing but a poor economic case; then the
whole regulatory scheme can be swept away and we will all be better off.
If some quality values are at stake, objective licensing can be used as a
better alternative to full economic entry regulation. The question is
whether this person or firm is fit for a particular activity. If the answer
is "yes" he gets in, regardless of how many are in the industry or how
well they are serving the public. Full disclosure is also another possible
alternative to much more detailed regulation in many non-monopolistic
situations. And there are a lot of incremental things that can be fitted
into even a "natural monopoly" scheme. For example, requiring peak
load pricing of utility services may not fit the label "deregulation" per se,
but it can make the regulatory process more efficient and more marketoriented. Another tool is more antitrust enforcement against voluntary
practices by regulated firms.
Looking at it in an overall sense, I agree with Professor Schwartz
that regulation or deregulation is not an all-or-nothing-at-all situation.5
It demands a case-by-case analysis of different regulatory schemes-the
way they operate, the goals they serve, and the costs they impose. The
process has a definite "nitty gritty" quality.
I had hoped that Jim Liebeler and Roger Noll would focus on the
cases -where the case for deregulation is really strong.' Trucking and
airline regulation may not present any interesting theoretical difficulties-but such schemes do involve large costs. I also wish that, if
Liebeler is going to take on the really heavy health and safety issues
(which just scare many "deregulation" supporters on Capitol Hill out of
their minds), he would show detailed interest in what would happen if
we withdrew FDA regulation. He just says he is "not interested."
Unless you are interested, you are not going to get anywhere on reform.
Professor Schwartz does express concern about these regulatory
details, but I do not understand his solution in many vital respects. He
says that we should separate the theory of regulation from the perfor5See Schwartz, The Deregulation of Industry: How Far Should We Go? A Built-ln
Bias, 51
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$See Nol, Breaking Out of the Regulatory Dilemma: Alternatives to the Sterile Choice?,
51 IND. L.J. 686 (1976), supra.
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i zance of the regulators. I think this is just wrong. We know what a
long-run average regulator looks like, and we even know that a shortrun marginal regulator has a still lower performance curve. The average
regulator is very average indeed. No theory of regulation that requires
a superregulator will work consistently well in the real world over
the long run.
Thus, to summarize, I see no clear general theory of regulation or
deregulation. I do see some theories of how we can go about deregulating. Its aim should be to simplify the decisionmaking process by
structuring it more precisely, while cutting out regulatory inquiries into
issues which can be better resolved by customer and entrepreneurial
choice. We must dramatize regulatory "horror stories" which nicely
illustrate how protectionist and irrelevant much regulation often is. We
must also smoke out the defenders of regulation as to their "public interest" justifications and then press for elimination of any regulation
that they cannot openly justify. Where the public need is narrow, narrower legal controls should be developed. Search for less anticompetitive
alternatives should be undertaken. In coming up with alternatives, we
must be more specific and detailed than are most of these papers. To
reduce regulation (let alone deregulate an activity), the reformer must
present a workable scheme, not some vague general suggestions as to
how it might work. And, if we really want to make progress, we must
begin with those cases where the case for economic regulation is weak.
Otherwise we invite more opposition and more confusion.
Of course confusion is nothing new in this field. Ken Jones, in
discussing the history of regulation, has noted: "The legal situation,
then, in the second half of the nineteenth century was one of complexity
and confusion." 7 What we have a century later is more complexity,
more confusion, and a great deal more law.
7W.

JONES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REGLATED INDUSTRIFs 29 (2d ed. 1975).

